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Abstract 
Little is known about the association between measured intelligence and how people 
participate in democratic processes. In the 1970 British Cohort Study, we examined the 
association between childhood intelligence and, at age 34: whether and how people voted 
in the 2001 UK general election; how they intended to vote; and whether they had taken 
part in other political activities. People with higher childhood intelligence were more likely 
to vote in the 2001 election (38% increased prevalence per SD increase in intelligence), and 
were more likely to vote for the Green Party and the Liberal Democrats (49% and 47% 
increased prevalence per SD increase in intelligence, respectively). The intelligence-Green 
party voting association was largely accounted for by occupational social class, the 
intelligence-Liberal Democrat voting association was not. Similar associations between 
intelligence and preference for the Green Party or Liberal Democrats were found as regards 
voting intentions, but neither of these associations was accounted for by occupational social 
class. People with higher childhood intelligence were more likely to take part in rallies and 
demonstrations, and to sign petitions, and expressed a greater interest in politics (40%, 
65%, 33%, and 58% increased prevalence per SD increase in intelligence, respectively). 
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Introduction 
Democracy as a political system allows—indirectly through elections—the whole adult 
population to be involved in the government of the nation. The involvement includes the 
regular selection of elected representatives, and the other legal means by which politically 
relevant concerns may be voiced (attending demonstrations, signing petitions, etc.). Liberal 
democracy involves stability and change. Stability includes the enduring aspects of the 
legal, financial, educational and other institutions of the society. None of these is entirely 
fixed; they evolve and, ultimately, suggestions for change can be traced to the decisions 
made by the electorate concerning their choice of their representatives and their decisions 
to become involved and press for societal changes in other ways. At the between-country 
level of description, intelligence has been reported as relevant to democracy, rule of law, 
and political freedom (Rindermann, 2008). Here, we investigate how individual differences 
in psychometric intelligence are associated with engaging in democratic processes. 
 
Political scientists have a strong interest in individual differences in voting behaviors, 
because decisions made by the electorate are so important for societies. Most research to 
date has concentrated on whether or not people vote in elections. The favoured explanatory 
variables for people’s participation in voting include political interest, civic duty and, 
especially relevant here because of its association with cognitive ability, education (Nie, 
Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996). However, the cause of the association between deciding to 
vote and educational attainments has been questioned, with the possibility that the 
underlying causal variable is cognitive ability (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, pp. 258-263; 
Hauser, 2000; Denny & Doyle, 2008). Surprisingly, it is only recently that psychological 
individual differences have been considered relevant to democratic participation and 
decision-making. Hauser’s (2000) empirical results with three USA datasets led him to 
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conclude that, “researchers will lose little if they ignore cognitive ability as a direct causal 
factor when formulating models of civic participation” (p. 581). However, Denny and 
Doyle (2008) criticised Hauser’s (2000) data on two counts: the cognitive ability tests were 
inadequate in two of the studies, and cognitive data were always collected in adulthood or 
when people had finished, or were about to finish, high school. Their study of the United 
Kingdom’s 1958 birth cohort suggested that the association between education and voting 
was weak, and that cognitive ability measured at age 11 years was a much stronger 
contributor to the decision about whether or not to vote in the 1997 General Election when 
the subjects were almost 40 years old (Denny & Doyle, 2008). These authors made a strong 
case for seeking other data sets containing childhood intelligence and voting information, 
so that cognitive ability measures that were recorded prior to educational attainments could 
be used to examine voting behavior. Specifically, they recommended that future research 
might use data from the 1970 British Cohort Study, which is what we have done in this 
report. 
 
We contend that the study of intelligence and political involvement should extend beyond 
the important topic of voter turnout, to include details of how, in addition to whether, 
people engage in elections, and whether they also take part in political and democratic 
activities outside of elections. Influences on how people vote include their occupational 
social class (Evans, 2000), and the political party that was in power when they reached the 
age at which they were eligible to vote (Tilley, 2002). One reason for exploring this issue 
further is that intelligence test scores are related to social attitudes. Social attitudes are 
embedded in the creeds of different political parties (see Appendix) and in the rationales of 
other, extra-parliamentary pressure groups seeking to bring about political change. People 
with higher mental test scores as children are more likely, as adults, to endorse liberal 
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social attitudes (Scarr & Weinberg, 1981, p. 400; McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & 
Keyes, 1999, p. 987). Specifically, they are more likely to agree with attitude statements 
that are anti-racist, in favour of working women, are socially liberal, and are more likely to 
have trust in the fairness of the democratic process (Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008). Thus, 
intelligence is, in effect, associated with different political attitudes, and it is important to 
discover if there are intelligence differences according to preference for particular political 
parties. 
 
In summary, there is debate about the importance of intelligence in relation to whether 
people vote in elections, and there is currently little information on how people with 
different levels of intelligence choose to vote in elections, and to what extent they become 
involved in non-election activity in democratic systems. In the present study we extend the 
study of intelligence and its relevance to political matters by investigating the association 
between childhood intelligence test scores and: whether people voted in the 2001 UK 
general election; reports of which parties they had voted for in the 2001 election, and which 
parties they would vote for currently; and participation in political activity outside of the 
normal election process. It is important to include information on occupation, because 
voting in the UK has traditionally been influenced by occupational social class (Evans, 
2000). The study was based upon longitudinal data available from a large, representative 
UK study: the 1970 British Cohort Study. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
The 1970 British Cohort Study is an ongoing longitudinal study that takes as its subjects the 
17,198 live births occurring to parents residing in Great Britain between April 5 and 11, 
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1970. The present analyses primarily use data from 1980-1981, when study participants 
completed tests of cognitive ability at age 10 years (though we also use cognitive data from 
5 years to test the consistency of the findings), and from 2004-5 when, at age 34 years, they 
responded to enquiries about their political attitudes and behaviors. In all, 14,875 children 
took part in the 10-year follow-up, 93% of those eligible to participate (alive and living in 
England, Scotland and Wales). Written, informed consent was given by parents. Testing 
took place in schools. Of 13,197 cohort members eligible to take part in the 34-year follow-
up, 9,665 (73%) agreed to be interviewed. In total, 6,352 (66% of those interviewed) had 
data on cognitive ability at the age of 10 years, political attitudes and behaviors at age 34, 
and current occupational social class. Compared to these 6,352 people, non-participants in 
the 34-year follow-up had a lower score on the tests of cognitive ability (IQ-type scale 
equivalent = 102.4 (14.3) vs 96.9 (15.3); p <0.001). 
 
Data collection at age 5 years 
Testing of the children’s mental ability took place in the children’s homes. Four tests were 
used: the Human Figure Drawing Test, a Copying Designs Test, the English Picture 
Vocabulary Test and the Profile Test. The Human Figure Drawing Test was a modified 
version of the Draw-a-Man Test, devised by Goodenough (1926) and developed by Harris 
(1963). The drawings were scored using an adapted version of the Harris–Goodenough 
scale (Scott, 1968; Koppitz, 1968). In the Copying Designs Test, children were asked to 
make two copies of eight designs (Davie, Butler, & Goldstein, 1972). The English Picture 
Vocabulary Test is an adaptation of the American Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
(Brimer & Dunn, 1968). In the Profile Test, children saw an incomplete profile of a head, 
were asked what it was, completed the drawing, and identified the parts. The correlations 
among the four tests are shown in Table 1. We carried out a principal components analysis 
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of these four tests. Examination of the scree slope suggested the presence of a single 
component. The first unrotated principal component accounted for 45% of the total 
variance among the four tests. The factor loading of each of the tests on the first unrotated 
principal component was 0.71 for the Human Figure Drawing Test, 0.75 for the Copying 
Designs, 0.63 for the English Picture Vocabulary Test and 0.55 for the Profile Test. Scores 
were saved for each subject on the first unrotated principal component, to provide an 
indicator of each person’s general cognitive ability (g) at 5 years. These scores were 
converted to traditional IQ-type scales with mean = 100, SD = 15. 
 
Data collection at age 10 years 
Cognitive ability was assessed using a modified version of the British Ability Scales (Elliot, 
Murray, & Pearson, 1978), adapted to facilitate administration by teachers. Verbal ability 
was assessed using 2 subscales: word definitions and word similarities. The word 
definitions subscale consisted of a list of 37 words. The teacher articulated each word in 
turn and quizzed the child about its meaning. The word similarities subscale consisted of 42 
items composed of 3 words (e.g., orange, banana, and strawberry, or sad, worried, and 
happy). For each item, the teacher enunciated the 3 words and asked the child to name 
another word consistent with the theme. Nonverbal ability was also assessed using 2 
subscales: recall of digits and matrices. The recall of digits subscale consisted of 34 items. 
For each item, the teacher read out digits at half-second intervals and asked the child to 
repeat them. The matrices subscale consisted of 28 incomplete patterns arrayed as a grid. 
For each item, the teacher asked the child to draw in the missing part of the pattern. Details 
of the validity and reliability of the British Ability Scales have been published (Elliot, 
1983). The reliabilities of these 4 subscales in children aged 10 were .91 (matrices), .82 
(digit recall), .79 (similarities), and .90 (word definitions). The correlations among the four 
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tests are shown in Table 2. We carried out principal components analysis of the scores from 
the four tests taken at age 10 years. Pearson correlation coefficients between scores on the 
four tests ranged from r = 0.31 (matrices and recall of digits) to r = 0.66 (word similarities 
and word definitions). Examination of the scree slope suggested the presence of a single 
component. The first unrotated principal component accounted for 57% of the total 
variance among the four tests. The loadings of the 10-year tests on the first unrotated 
principal component were 0.83 for word definitions, 0.84 for word similarities, 0.58 for 
digit recall, and 0.74 for matrices. Scores were saved for each participant on the first 
unrotated principal component, thereby providing a measure of general cognitive ability (g) 
at age 10 years. These scores were converted to traditional IQ-type scales with mean = 100, 
SD = 15. 
 
Data collection at age 34 years 
Participants completed a computer-administered questionnaire that included items on 
political behavior and attitudes. Participants were asked whether they had voted in the 
General Election in 2001 and, if so, which party they had supported. They were also asked 
to indicate which party they would support currently and how interested they were in 
politics (on a 4-point scale ranging from ‘very interested’ to ‘not at all interested’). In 
addition, they were asked whether, during the previous year, they had taken part in a public 
demonstration, attended a public meeting or rally, or signed a petition. 
 
Data on the person’s current occupation were collected and used to derive social class. If 
no data were available on current social class due, for example, to a small proportion of 
women not being employed while caring for their family, information on social class from 
the previous follow-up in adulthood (age 30) was used instead. This was coded into six 
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categories according to the UK Registar General’s Classification of Occupations (Office of 
Population and Census Studies, 1980). The categories are named in the columns of 
Appendix Table 1. 
 
Statistical analyses 
The principal analyses used logistic regression to investigate the relation between 
childhood general cognitive ability (intelligence) score and political attitudes and behaviors 
reported at age 34, with adjustment for adult occupational social class. Risk estimates (odds 
ratios) are expressed per standard deviation increase in intelligence score, and per unit 
change in social class category. An odds ratio of exactly 1.0 means the predictor has no 
relation with an outcome. An odds ratio greater than 1.0 indicates that the predictor 
variable is associated with an increase in the rate at which the behavioral outcome occurs, 
whereas an odds ratio below this value is evidence of a decrease. For example, an odds 
ratio of 1.30 means that there is a 30% increase in the prevalence of the outcome per unit of 
measurement in the predictor; and an odds ratio of 0.70 means that there is a 30% decrease 
in the prevalence per unit of measurement in the predictor. If the 95% confidence intervals 
do not span 1.0 (unity) then the relationship is statistically significant at the conventional 
level (p < .05). We also provide point biserial correlations to complement these analyses. 
 
Results 
Unless age 5 intelligence data are mentioned specifically, all other results with childhood 
intelligence scores below refer to the tests taken at age 10. The correlation between the 
general cognitive ability factors (actually, the first unrotated principal components) 
extracted at age 5 and age 10 years was .497 (p < .001). 
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The 2001 UK general election 
Subjects who voted in the 2001 UK general election had higher childhood intelligence 
scores at age 10 than those who did not (p < .001) (Appendix Table 1). Similar results were 
found for intelligence scores at age 5, where voters had a mean of 102.3 and non-voters a 
mean of 99.4 (p < .001). Voters were more likely to be employed in more professional 
occupations (p < .001) (Appendix Table 1). There was no significant sex difference 
between voters and non-voters. 
 
There was a significant difference in intelligence test scores when the party voted for in the 
2001 general election was considered (p < .001) (Appendix Table 1, and see Appendix for 
brief descriptions of political parties). People who reported voting for the Green Party and 
the Liberal Democrats had the highest mean intelligence scores, and those voting for the 
UK Independence Party had the lowest scores. There was a significant sex difference in 
voting patterns (p < .001). Women were somewhat more likely to vote Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, Green, and less likely than men to vote for the other parties (Appendix Table 1). 
There was a significant difference in occupational social class according to party voted for 
(p < .001). For example, 24.8% of people in ‘professional’ occupations voted for the 
Conservative Party, but only 9.7% of people in ‘unskilled’ jobs. By contrast, 46.4% of 
those in professional occupations and 77.4% of those in unskilled jobs voted for the Labour 
Party. 
 
The likelihood that people voted in the 2001 general election rose by 38% per standard 
deviation increase in intelligence test score at age 10 (p < .001; rpb = .14), and by 30% per 
category change in social class toward more professional occupations (p < .001) (Table 3). 
When the intelligence association with voting was additionally adjusted for occupational 
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social class the rate was attenuated only slightly—to a 24% increase per standard 
deviation—and was still highly significant. A similar pattern was seen in relation to 
intelligence at age 5. The odds ratio for voting according to a SD increase in general 
intelligence test score at age 5 was 1.23 (95% CI = 1.17, 1.29). After adjusting for adult 
occupational social class, this was undiminished, at 1.25 (95% CI = 1.18, 1.33). 
 
Next, we examined the odds ratios of voting for a party other than the Labour Party (the 
party with the largest number of voters in this sample, and the party in power at the time of 
the survey). In sex-adjusted models, there was a 47% increased prevalence of voting for the 
Liberal Democrats, and a 49% increased likelihood of voting for the Green Party per 
standard deviation increase in intelligence test scores (Table 3). No other comparisons were 
significant. In sex-adjusted models, there was a 25% increased prevalence of voting for the 
Liberal Democrats, a 61% increased likelihood of voting for the Green Party, and a 18% 
decreased prevalence of voting for the British National Party per unit change toward more 
professional occupational status. When the associations between intelligence test scores 
and party voting were additionally adjusted for occupational social class, the association 
with voting for the Green Party was attenuated by 45% (odds ratio of 1.49 changed to 
1.27), and was no longer significant. The association between intelligence and voting for 
the Liberal Democrats was attenuated by only 13% (odds ratio of 1.47 changed to 1.41) and 
remained significant at p < .001. One additional analysis was carried out, based on voting 
for the Liberal Democrats rather than the Conservative Party. The sex-adjusted odds ratio 
for this per standard deviation increase in intelligence is 1.40 (95% CI = 1.26, 1.56).  If 
further adjusted for social class, the odds ratio is 1.44 (95% CI = 1.28, 1.62). 
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The correlations between intelligence test scores and voting decisions were as follows: 
Conservative Party rather than Labour Party, rpb = .041 (p = .017); Liberal Democrats 
rather than Labour Party, rpb = .15 (p < .001); Liberal Democrats rather than Conservative 
Party, rpb = .14 (p < .001). 
 
Voting intentions in 2004 
There was a significant (p < .001) difference in intelligence test scores according to which 
party people said they would vote for currently (Appendix Table 1). The pattern was 
similar to that found for party voted for at the 2001 general election, as were the patterns 
for the sex and occupational social class differences. Although starting from low absolute 
numbers in the 2001 general election, with respect to voting intentions in 2004 there were 
notably increased percentages of women and men intending to vote for the UK 
Independence and Green Parties, and more men intending to vote for the British National 
Party (Appendix Table 1). 
 
We examined the odds ratios of intending, in 2004, to vote for a party other than the 
Labour Party (the party with the largest number of intending voters in this sample). In sex-
adjusted models, based on a standard deviation increase in intelligence scores, the 
following were significant: there was a 11% increased prevalence of intending to vote for 
the Conservative Party, a 46% increased prevalence of intending to vote for the Liberal 
Democrats, a 49% increased prevalence of intending to vote for the Green Party, and a 26% 
decreased prevalence of intending to vote for the British National Party (Table 4). With 
regard to each category change of occupational social class, people in more professional 
occupations were significantly more likely to vote Conservative (11%), Liberal Democrat 
(28%), Green (15%), and significantly less likely to vote Scottish National (16%), British 
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National (34%), and UK Independence (13%). When the associations between intelligence 
test scores and current voting intentions were additionally adjusted for occupational social 
class, the association with intending to vote for the Liberal Democrats was attenuated by 
17% (odds ratio of 1.46 to 1.38) and was still significant (p < .001), and the association 
with intending to vote for the Green Party was attenuated by only 4% (odds ratio of 1.49 to 
1.47) and was still significant (p < .001). Other associations between intelligence and party 
voting were non-significant after adjusting for occupational social class. One additional 
analysis was carried out, based on intentions to vote for the Liberal Democrats rather than 
the Conservative Party. The sex-adjusted odds ratio for this per standard deviation increase 
in intelligence is 1.31 (95% CI = 1.20, 1.43).  If further adjusted for social class, the odds 
ratio is 1.32 (95% CI = 1.20, 1.46). 
 
The correlations between intelligence test scores and voting intentions were as follows: 
Conservative Party rather than Labour Party, rpb = .075 (p < .001); Liberal Democrats 
rather than Labour Party, rpb = .17 (p < .001); Liberal Democrats rather than Conservative 
Party, rpb = .11 (p < .001). 
 
Political interest and activity other than elections 
People who took part in a political meeting or rally in the last year, those who took part in a 
public demonstration, those who signed a petition, and those who were fairly or very 
interested in politics had higher mean intelligence test scores at age 10 (Appendix Table 1). 
In sex-adjusted models, the increased prevalence of engaging in these activities or of being 
interested in politics per standard deviation increase in intelligence was: political meeting 
or rally = 40%, public demonstration = 65%, petition = 33%, and interested in politics = 
58% (Table 5). All of these associations were significant at p < .001. People in more 
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professional occupations were also more likely to report these political involvements and 
interest (Appendix Table 1 and Table 3). After adjusting the associations between 
intelligence and political involvement and interest for occupational social class, all of them 
remained significant at p < .001, and the attenuations in the odds ratios were as follows: 
political meeting or rally = 30% (odds ratio of 1.40 to 1.28), public demonstration = 15% 
(1.65 to 1.55), petition = 6% (1.33 to 1.31), and interested in politics = 26% (1.58 to 1.43) 
(Table 3). 
 
The correlations between intelligence test scores and aspects of democratic participation 
were as follows (all p < .001): whether attended a rally/public meeting, rpb = .069; whether 
taken part in a demonstration or protest, rpb = .069; whether signed a petition, rpb = .11; and 
fairly or very interested in politics, rpb = .20. These four items and whether people voted or 
not in the 2001 election were combined to make a five-point scale of overall political 
involvement, which correlated .24 (p < .001) with general cognitive ability at age 10. 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, childhood intelligence was associated with whether people vote in 
elections, how they vote, and whether they engage in other political actions that contribute 
to the democratic process. Higher intelligence at the age of 10 was a predictor of voting in 
the UK’s 2001 General Election, as was general intelligence from age 5. The effect was 
somewhat attenuated by occupational social class, but still highly significant after 
adjustment for this factor. Compared with voting Labour, people with higher intelligence 
were more likely to vote for the Green Party and the Liberal Democrats. The former was 
largely accounted for by occupational social class, the latter was not. With respect to voting 
intentions in 2004, support for these same two parties and the Conservative Party were 
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associated with higher childhood intelligence. Intention to vote for the British National 
Party—a party with a strongly anti-immigration ideology—was less likely among people of 
higher childhood intelligence. After adjustment for occupational social class, only the 
intention to vote for the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party remained significantly 
associated with childhood intelligence. Engagement in other forms of political and 
democratic activity was significantly associated with childhood intelligence, as was degree 
of interest in politics. None of these associations was strongly accounted for by 
occupational social class. 
 
The study adds to the debate about whether intelligence plays a part in people’s decision 
about whether or not to vote in elections. Hauser (2000) concluded that intelligence was 
unimportant in this respect, but Denny and Doyle (2008) disagreed, and insisted that 
childhood intelligence measures were important, because they pre-date major educational 
differences. In the present study we examined general intelligence from cognitive test 
batteries taken at age 5 and 10 years, and scores from both ages were related to reports 
about whether people had voted. The age 5 results are especially striking as no formal 
schooling has taken by that age. By age 10, the subjects had been involved in primary 
school education only, and up to this stage there is no differentiation of the curriculum 
according to ability. 
 
It is becoming clear that intelligence plays an important role in socio-political attitudes and 
actions: it is linked with more liberal social attitudes (Deary, Batty & Gale, 2008) and the 
decision to vote (Denny & Doyle, 2008). It is notable that higher intelligence was 
associated with endorsing ‘alternatives’ to the two major UK political parties. The Liberal 
Democrats are seen as the alternative to the two major parties that have traditionally been 
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linked with occupational social classes, and the Green Party is associated with an 
alternative, more sustainable way of living. In 2001, voting for the Liberal Democrats was 
associated with intelligence and this association was not accounted for by occupational 
social class. This was also found, in 2004, for voting intentions toward both the Green 
Party and Liberal Democrats. This contrasts with the associations we found between 
intelligence and whether or not people supported the Conservative Party and the British 
National Party, both of which were accounted for by adult occupational social class. This 
might be because support for both these parties has traditionally been strongly social-class 
based, drawn predominantly from non-manual occupational social classes in the case of the 
Conservative Party, and from more disadvantaged social classes in the case of the British 
National Party. 
 
Strengths of the study include the large, fairly representative sample of the UK population, 
the measurements of intelligence in early life prior to the period of major educational 
attainment and before there are large differences in schooling, and the assessment of 
intelligence with validated subtests and the extraction of a general cognitive component. 
The study’s limitations include the facts that all the political measures were self-reported, 
affiliations with some political parties had small numbers, and the results are based on a 
single sample of the same age. Although these data apply to one country’s political system, 
there are broad similarities in political parties across Western democracies, and so these 
data might have wider relevance beyond the UK. Non-responders were about one-third 
standard deviation below the responders on childhood intelligence. Therefore, the sample 
had range restriction with respect to the population. Accordingly, the results presented here 
might be slight underestimates of the population effects due to this range restriction in 
cognitive ability. The criterion measures used here are mostly single items. Single items 
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tend to be relatively low in reliability. It is possible that the results presented here are 
underestimates of the population effects due to the imperfect reliability of the dependent 
measures. 
 
In conclusion, participation in voting and other democratic activities are associated with 
intelligence, and these are largely not a result of occupational social class. Childhood 
intelligence is associated with how and how much people engage in the democratic 
processes, and with support for political ideologies that are based on ecological 
sustainability and social liberalism. This extends the areas of modern living for which 
intelligence differences have significance. 
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Table 1 
Correlations between cognitive ability measures at age 5. 
 
 English picture vocabulary test Human figure drawing test Copying designs test 
Profile test .14 .22 .19 
English picture vocabulary test - .29 .32 
Human figure drawing test  - .50 
 
All correlations significant at p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Correlations between cognitive ability measures at age 10. 
 
 Recall of digits Word definitions Word similarities 
Matrices  .31 .47 .49 
Recall of digits - .32 .33 
Word definitions  - .65 
 
All correlations significant at p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Odds ratios (95% CI) for voting in the 2001 general election and for voting for other political parties in preference to Labour. 
 
 No (%) OR for a SD increase in 
intelligence, adjusted 
for sex 
OR for a category change 
towards higher adult 
social class 
OR for a SD increase in 
intelligence, adjusted for sex 
and adult social class 
Voted in 2001 General Election 4093 (64.4) 1.38 (1.30 to 1.46)*** 1.30 (1.25 to 0.36)*** 1.26 (1.19 to 1.24)*** 
     
Party voted for in preference to 
Labour 
    
Conservative 1058 (33.8) 1.05 (0.97 to 1.14) 1.13 (1.06 to 1.20) 1.00 (0.92 to 1.09) 
Liberal Democrat 615 (22.8) 1.47 (1.34 to 1.62)*** 1.25 (1.15 to 1.35)*** 1.41 (1.27 to 1.56)*** 
Scottish National 92 (4.24) 0.93 (0.75 to 1.16) 0.90 (0.76 to 1.06) 0.96 (0.76 to 1.22) 
Green 78 (3.62) 1.49 (1.17 to 1.89)*** 1.61 (1.27 to 2.02)*** 1.27 (0.98 to 1.65) 
British National  69 (3.21) 0.86 (0.67 to 1.11) 0.82 (0.68 to 0.99)* 0.93 (0.71 to 1.21) 
UK Independence 61 (2.85) 0.79 (0.59 to 1.02) 0.88 (0.72 to 1.08) 0.79 (0.59 to 1.06) 
Plaid Cymru 37 (1.75) 0.96 (0.68 to 1.34) 0.99 (0.76 to 1.29) 0.95 (0.66 to 1.36) 
     
 
***p<0.001, *p<0.05 
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Table 4 
Odds ratios (95% CI) for intending to vote for other political parties in preference to Labour in 2004. 
 
Party intending to vote for in 
preference to Labour 
No (%) OR for a SD increase in 
intelligence, adjusted 
for sex 
OR for a category change 
towards higher adult 
social class 
OR for a SD increase in 
intelligence, adjusted for sex 
and adult social class 
     
Conservative 1436 (44.6) 1.11 (1.03 to 1.19)** 1.11 (1.04 to 1.17)** 1.07 (0.99 to 1.16) 
Liberal Democrat 902 (33.6) 1.46 (1.34 to 1.59)*** 1.28 (1.19 to 1.37)*** 1.38 (1.26 to 1.51)*** 
Scottish National 246 (12.1) 0.87 (0.71 to 1.05) 0.84 (0.73 to 0.98)* 0.92 (0.74 to 1.13) 
Green 211 (10.6) 1.49 (1.28 to 1.73)*** 1.15 (1.02 to 1.30)* 1.47 (1.25 to 1.73)*** 
British National  113 (5.96) 0.74 (0.57 to 0.96)* 0.66 (0.54 to 0.80)*** 0.88 (0.67 to 1.16) 
UK Independence 62 (3.36) 0.90 (0.78 to 1.03) 0.87 (0.78 to 0.96)** 0.96 (0.82 to 1.19) 
Plaid Cymru 39 (2.14) 0.82 (0.59 to 1.13) 0.94 (0.73 to 1.21) 0.81 (0.57 to 1.15) 
     
 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 5 
Odds ratios (95% CI) for taking part in other democratic procedures in the previous year and for being interested in politics. 
 
 No (%) OR for a SD increase in 
intelligence, adjusted 
for sex 
OR for a category change 
towards higher adult 
social class 
OR for a SD increase in 
intelligence, adjusted for sex 
and adult social class 
Attended public meeting or rally in 
last year 
282 (4.4) 1.40 (1.24 to 1.59)*** 1.35 (1.21 to 1.51)*** 1.28 (1.11 to 1.46)*** 
     
Taken part in public demonstration  131 (2.1) 1.65 (1.37 to 1.98)*** 1.32 (1.13 to 1.54)*** 1.55 (1.27 to 1.89)*** 
     
Signed a petition  1459 (23.0) 1.33 (1.25 to 1.41)*** 1.13 (1.08 to 1.19)*** 1.31 (1.22 to 1.40)*** 
     
Fairly or very interested in politics 2670 (42.0) 1.58 (1.50 to 1.67)*** 1.35 (1.29 to 1.41)*** 1.43 (1.35 to 1.52)*** 
     
 
***p<0.001 
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Appendix 
Brief descriptions of UK political parties 
 
Labour Party 
Founded in 1900 to represent the interests of the working-class population. 
Traditionally left-wing, with strong ties to trade unions, the Labour Party has become 
increasingly centrist. Labour has been the party in power in Britain since 1997 to date 
(2008). Its ideology is social democracy. 
 
Conservative Party 
Founded in 1830, this traditionally centre-right to right wing party is currently the 
chief opposition to Labour. It is the largest political party on the centre-right. It was in 
power in the UK most recently from 1979 to 1997. Its ideology is conservatism. 
 
Liberal Democrat Party 
Founded in 1988 but originating from the early 19th century ‘Liberal Party’, this 
traditionally centrist party is the smallest of the three major political parties in Britain. 
It is strongly committed to the welfare state and social provision. Its ideology is social 
liberalism. 
 
Scottish National Party 
Founded in 1934, this centre-left party has representatives in the United Kingdom’s 
parliament at Westminster, and has been in power in the devolved Scottish 
Government since 2007. Its ideology is Scottish independence and social democracy. 
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Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) 
Founded in 1925, this centre-left party is traditionally popular in Welsh-speaking 
parts of Wales. Its ideology is Welsh independence and social democracy. 
 
Green Party 
Founded in 1973, this centre-left party is committed to ecological sustainability. As 
yet, it has very few elected representatives. Its ideology is green. 
 
UK Independence Party 
Founded in 1993, the aim of this party is to seek UK withdrawal from the European 
Union. Its ideology is conservatism and ‘Euroscepticism’. As yet, it has very few 
elected representatives. 
 
British National Party 
Founded in 1982, this minor far-right party is committed to “stemming and reversing 
the tide of non-white immigration”. Its ideology is white and British nationalism. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Characteristics of the participants according to voting behavior, voting intentions and indicators of democratic participation and interest in 
politics (n=6352). 
 
  Mean (SD) 
intelligence at 
age 10 
Sex – no (%) Current social class – no (%) 
   Male Female Professional Managerial/ 
technical 
Skilled 
non-
manual 
Skilled 
manual 
Semi-
skilled 
Unskilled 
Voted in 2001 
General 
Election 
Yes 104.0 (14.2) 1997 
(63.6) 
2096 
(65.2) 
309 (75.0) 1767 (71.0) 905 
(65.0) 
643 
(53.5) 
405 
(56.3) 
64 (46.0) 
 No 99.7*** (14.1)  1141 
(36.4) 
1118 
(34.8) 
103 (25.0) 720 (29.0) 487 
(35.0) 
559 
(46.5) 
315 
(43.8) 
75 
(54.0)*** 
Party 
supported in 
2001 Election 
          
Conservative - 103.7 (13.5) 562 
(28.6) 
496 (23.9) 78 (24.8) 485 (27.8) 236 
(26.2) 
166 
(26.2) 
89 
(22.5) 
6 (9.7) 
Labour - 103.0 (14.2) 980 
(49.8) 
1095 
(52.7) 
142 (46.4) 855 (49.0) 460 
(51.1) 
341 
(53.8) 
229 
(58.0) 
48 (77.4) 
Liberal 
Democrat 
- 108.2 (14.4) 266 
(13.5) 
349 (16.8) 69 (22.5) 280 (16.0) 148 
(16.4) 
67 (10.6) 46 
(11.6) 
5 (8.1) 
Scottish 
National 
- 102.2 (14.2) 59 (3.0) 33 (1.6) 5 (1.6) 34 (1.9) 18 (2.0) 22 (3.5) 11 (2.8) 2 (3.2) 
Green - 108.3 (12.9) 24 (1.2) 54 (2.6) 9 (2.9) 47 (2.7) 12 (1.3) 7 (1.1) 3 (0.8) 0 (0) 
British 
National  
- 101.1 (15.7) 16 (0.8) 11 (0.5) 0 (0) 6 (0.3) 8 (0.9) 8 (1.3) 5 (1.3) 0 (0) 
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UK 
Independent 
- 99.7 (13.4) 37 (1.9) 25 (1.2) 2 (0.7) 24 (1.4) 12 (1.3) 16 (2.5) 8 (2.0) 0 (0) 
Plaid Cymru - 102.5 
(16.5)*** 
22 (1.1) 15 
(0.7)*** 
3 (1.0) 15 (0.9) 7 (0.8) 7 (1.1) 4 (1.0) 1 (1.6)*** 
Party 
intending to 
vote for in 
2004 
          
Conservative - 103.1 (13.9) 807 
(28.6) 
629 (23.5) 104 (28.8) 604 (27.9) 307 
(26.2) 
276 
(25.8) 
129 
(21.5) 
16 (12.8) 
Labour - 101.6 (14.6) 861 
(30.5) 
923 (34.5) 113 (31.3) 700 (32.3) 376 
(32.1) 
338 
(31.6) 
213 
(35.5) 
44 (35.2) 
Liberal 
Democrat 
- 106.9 (14.5) 397 
(14.1) 
505 (18.9) 92 (25.5) 416 (19.2) 208 
(17.8) 
108 
(10.1) 
65 
(10.8) 
13 (10.4) 
Scottish 
National 
- 100.2 (12.8) 71 (2.5) 42 (1.6) 3 (0.8) 39 (1.8) 19 (1.6) 34 (3.2) 14 (2.3) 4 (3.2) 
Green - 107.1 (13.7) 86 (3.0) 125 (4.7) 14 (3.9) 100 (4.6) 42 (3.6) 32 (3.0) 19 (3.2) 4 (3.2) 
British 
National  
- 99.6 (13.5) 48 (1.7) 14 (0.5) 1 (0.3) 11 (0.5) 12 (1.0) 25 (2.3) 9 (1.5) 4 (3.2) 
UK 
Independence 
- 97.4 (12.2) 150 (5.3) 96 (3.6) 8 (2.2) 80 (3.7) 54 (4.6) 66 (6.2) 33 (5.5) 5 (4.0) 
Plaid Cymru - 98.7 (17.0) 25 (0.9) 14 (0.5) 3 (0.8) 15 (0.7) 6 (0.5) 8 (0.7) 5 (0.8) 2 (1.6) 
None - 98.1 (13.4)*** 375 
(13.3) 
325 
(12.2)*** 
23 (6.4) 202 (9.3) 147 
(12.6) 
182 
(17.0) 
113 
(18.8) 
33 
(26.4)*** 
Democratic 
participation 
and political 
interest 
          
Attended Yes 106.8 (14.7) 142 (4.5) 140 (4.4) 35 (8.5) 128 (5.1) 62 (4.5) 38 (3.2) 17 (2.4) 2 (1.4) 
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public meeting 
or rally in last 
year 
 No 102.2(14.2)***  2996 
(95.5) 
3074 
(95.6) 
377 (91.5) 2359 (94.9) 1330 
(95.5) 
1164 
(96.8) 
703 
(97.6) 
137 
(98.6)*** 
           
Taken part in 
public 
demonstration 
in last year 
Yes 109.0 (14.8) 64 (2.0) 67 (2.1) 15 (3.6) 63 (2.5) 26 (1.9) 16 (1.3) 9 (1.3) 2 (1.4) 
 No 102.3 
(14.3)*** 
3074 
(98.0) 
3147 
(97.9) 
397 (96.4) 2424 (97.5) 1366 
(98.1) 
1186 
(98.7) 
711 
(98.8) 
137 
(98.6)* 
           
Signed a 
petition in last 
year 
Yes 105.3 (14.0) 615 
(19.6) 
844 (26.3) 105 (25.5) 648 (26.1) 311 
(22.3) 
215 
(17.9) 
156 
(21.7) 
24 (17.3) 
 No 101.6 
(14.3)***  
2523 
(80.4) 
2370 
(73.7)*** 
307 (74.5) 1839 (73.9) 1081 
(77.7) 
987 
(82.1) 
564 
(78.3) 
115 
(82.7)*** 
           
Fairly or very 
interested in 
politics 
Yes 105.9 (14.3) 1589 
(50.6) 
1081 
(33.6) 
253 (61.4) 1254 (50.4) 474 
(34.1) 
436 
(36.3) 
211 
(29.3) 
42 (30.2) 
 No 99.9 (13.7)***  1549 
(49.4) 
2133 
(66.4)*** 
159 (38.6) 1233 (49.6) 918 
(65.9) 
766 
(63.7) 
509 
(70.7) 
97 
(69.8)*** 
Note: 4,044 participants provided information on which party they had voted for in the 2001 General Election, and 5,493 on which party they 
would vote for currently. *** p<0.001; these p values refer to comparisons of the outcomes based on childhood intelligence scores, sex, and 
adult occupational social class. 
 
 
